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PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION: LAW AND PROCEDURE
Melvin G. Dakin*
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
The legislature has provided that an appointing authority or
employee in the classified service subject to the jurisdiction of Munic-
ipal Fire and Police Civil Service Boards may take an appeal to a
district court in the event of dissatisfaction with a decision of the
board.' On appeal the district court has jurisdiction to determine
whether the decision of the board was "made in good faith for cause";
the notice of appeal must state the grounds for the appeal.2 In Odom
v. City of Minden,' the Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that a
district court is without jurisdiction over the appeal where the notice
filed by the city did not allege facts from which it could be deduced
that the board had not acted in good faith for cause but instead stated
merely that the city acted in good faith in abolishing a classification.
The allegation in the notice of appeal that the city had acted in good
faith for cause could not be interpreted or substituted for the neces-
sary allegation that the board had made an error in its decision and
had hence not acted for cause.' The rules of the State Civil Service
Commission are more specific in that they require that a notice of
appeal "contain a clear and concise statement of the action claimed
against and the basis of the appeal" and for summary dismissal of
appeals at the instance of the appointing authority where the "appeal
has not been made in the required manner or within the prescribed
period of delay." 5 In Duczer v. State Banking Department,6 em-
ployee's notice alleged that he had been forced to resign his position
for the reason that he was "indebted to institutions under the super-
vision of the Louisiana Banking Department." 7 The department filed
a motion for summary disposition of the appeal alleging that em-
ployee resigned and was not dismissed, submitting in support thereof
a rather cryptic letter of resignation from the employee.' The commis-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 33:2501, 2561 (1950).
2. Id.
3. 263 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972), writs granted, 262 La. 1077, 266 So. 2d
216 (1972).
4. Id. at 412.
5. LA. Civ. SEnv. R. 13.11(d).
6. 277 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
7. Id. at 454.
8. Id. at 453.
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sion granted the motion but the court of appeal reversed on the
grounds that these pleadings were adequate to put in issue whether
the employee had been forced to resign and that a hearing must be
held on this issue of fact.' A state or city civil service commission is
not limited to acting upon appeals; it is also authorized, upon its own
initiative or upon written charges by any person, to investigate
charges.'" In In Re Roberts," a commission investigated, on its own
initiative, charges of fraud on the part of an employment applicant.
The investigation came some four years after the alleged fraud. The
First Circuit Court of Appeal held that while the constitutional provi-
sion requires a commission to proceed with its investigation within
one year where written charges have been filed, no such limitation
applies where the commission is proceeding ex proprio motu. '2
The scope of judicial review of findings of fact by the State Civil
Service Commission has been before the court on innumerable occa-
sions. The governing provision is the constitutional requirement that
the decisions shall be "final on the facts."' 3 Our supreme court has
said that this means the courts may not "inquire into the sufficiency
of the evidence to ascertain whether the commission was correct in
its finding of fact, and if there is any evidence to support its finding
of fact, such finding may not be disturbed."'" This has been variously
referred to as the "any evidence" rule,'" the "some evidence" rule,'6
the "no evidence" rule,'7 the "reasonable man" test'8 and the "sub-
stantial evidence" rule.'" Whatever the nomenclature, our supreme
court has clearly indicated that if the commission finding is sup-
ported by evidence, even though another finding more acceptable to
the court might also be found to be supported by evidence, the re-
viewing court may nonetheless not disturb the commission's finding.
9. Id. at 454. Presumably, if the resignation was not voluntary, a written notice
of dismissal setting forth the basis therefore would be required. See The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1956-1957 Term-Administrative Law, 18 LA. L.
REV. 79 (1957).
10. LA. CONST. art. 14, § 15(N)(4), (0)(4).
11. 263 So. 2d 452 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1972).
12. Id. at 455.
13. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15(O)(1).
14. Leggett v. Northwestern State Coll., 242 La. 927, 938, 140 So. 2d 5, 9 (1962).
15. Bland v. City of Houma, 264 So. 2d 729 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
16. McDaniel v. Department of Safety & Permits, 270 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1972).
17. Parker v. City of Bossier, 276 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Smith v.
Board of Comm'rs, 274 So. 2d 394 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
18. Morrell v. Department of Welfare, 266 So. 2d 559 (La. App. 4th Cir. 19.72).
19. Bland v. City of Houma, 264 So. 2d 729, 734 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
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The preferred language is the "any evidence" language to distinguish
it from the "substantial evidence" rule which does entail at least
enough weighing of the evidence to satisfy the court that a reasonable
man could choose either of two alternatives.'" Despite the fact that a
court may feel bound by the constitutional provision not to substitute
its judgment as to the weight of the evidence in a commission appeal,
it will not permit a commission to ignore evidence in the course of
making its findings. Thus, in Meaux v. Department of Highways,"
the commission had before it an issue as to the number of times per
month certain bridges were open, such openings affecting the rate of
pay of the employees. There was data in the commission record for a
six month period from which average monthly bridge openings could
be determined. The commission chose to ignore this evidence except
for the last thirty days on the theory that evidence from prior periods
concerned possible violations no longer appealable." The result was
a decision adverse to the appealing employees. To the reviewing court
of appeal this procedure was deemed "comparable to a refusal to
make a factual decision on the merits such as was encountered in
Blanchard v. New Orleans Police Department . "..."23 In the
Blanchard case the commission was directed to draw those factual
conclusions that by a preponderance of the probabilities shown by the
record had been established. The analogy is thus that ignoring evi-
dence in the record on the basis of an erroneous view of its authority
by the commission was tantamount to not making a finding "by a
preponderance of the probabilities shown by the record."2
On the other hand, when the alleged error is with respect to a
question of law, the reviewing court is deemed free to fully substitute
its judgment. Thus in Blake v. Giarrusso,25 the employee argued that
the appointing authority was obligated to promote him to existing
vacancies because he had been placed on eligibility lists for such
vacancies. A court of appeal rejected the contention citing the perti-
nent civil service rules establishing discretion in the appointing au-
thorities. 2 As precedent the court cited Sewell v. New Orleans Police
20. Gervais v. New Orleans P.D., 226 La. 782, 787, 77 So. 2d 393, 395 (1954).
21. 274 So. 2d 486 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
22. Id. at 488, 489.
23. Id. at 489, citing Blanchard v. New Orleans P.D., 210 So. 2d 585 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1968).
24. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Administrative Regulation: Law and Procedure, 31 LA. L. REv. 292, 294, 295
(1971).
25. 263 So. 2d 392 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
26. N.O. Civ. S_.v. R. VI, § 2.1.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Department7 in which it was noted that appointing authority has
,'much discretion in choosing employees for promotion certified as
eligible from a list. It is not his mandatory duty to promote. Promo-
tions do not take place automatically or as a matter of right .... "20
In Digerolomo v. French Market Corp. ,2 the court of appeal also held
as a matter of law that there could be no employment in the classified
service merely by the fact of employment by a public body; to qualify
for the classified service the court held there must be either appoint-
ment after certification of eligibility after examination, waiver of
such procedure or "blanketing in."30 Again in Alonzo v. Louisiana
Department of Highways, 31 a complaining employee alleged illegal
action by the commission because only three members of the five-
man body heard the case and only two out of the three sitting mem-
bers found against him. The constitution provides that three mem-
bers of the commission shall constitute a quorum but does not pro-
vide a procedure for decision. 32 The court of appeal adopted ency-
clopedic jurisprudence stating that "the idea of a quorum is that
when the required number of persons goes into a. session as a body
the vote of a majority thereof are sufficient for binding action. 3 3 In
Hunsinger v. Louisiana Department of Highways, 34 the court of ap-
peal upheld the validity of a civil service rule providing for transfer
of a permanent employee upon the mere recommendation of the ap-
pointing authority and approval of the director of personnel. Noting
that the constitution proscribes only demotion, dismissal or discrimi-
nation except for causes expressed in writing,35 the court reasoned
that a transfer to a similar or better position at another location was
not a demotion and required only a recommendation, not "charges."36
SCHOOL BOARDS
The legislature has sought to achieve fairness in school board
27. 221 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
28. Id. at 623.
29. 272 So. 2d 385 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
30. Id. at 387.
31. 268 So. 2d 52 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
32. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15(c).
33. 268 So. 2d at 54; 74 C.J.S. 171 (1951). In State ex rel. Broussard v. Gauthe,
265 So. 2d 828 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972), the same result was achieved where a school
board had pursuant to general statutory authority to adopt rules for its governance,
provided that meetings be conducted under Robert's Rules of Order.
34. 271 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
35. LA. CONST., art. XIV, § 15(N)(1); LA. CIv. SERv. R. 8.15.
36. 271 So. 2d at 694.
[Vol. 34
19741 WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1972-1973 305
discharge procedure by providing that probationary teachers shall
have notice in writing of prospective discharge at the expiration of a
probationary term and shall be discharged during a probationary
term only upon the written recommendation of the superintendent.3 7
A tenured teacher is of course entitled to notice, written charges, and
a full hearing prior to a discharge. 3 In Fleming v. Concordia Parish
School Board,"9 there was confusion of these procedures which, while
it may have served the public interest, resulted in harshness and
possible unfairness to the teacher. In that case a probationary teacher
was notified that charges of willfull neglect of duty and incompetency
had been preferred against her by her principal and that the superin-
tendent was convening a hearing at which she would have the right
to appear with witnesses and counsel. There was no indication that
the hearing was to be before the school board with dismissal as a
possible outcome rather than a hearing before the superintendent to
determine what recommendation he should make to the school
board."' The teacher appeared (without counsel) at the hearing and
witnesses were heard and cross-examined by the teacher; thereafter
at a later reconvened hearing the board found her incompetent and
dismissed her.4 No recommendation by the superintendent was ever
submitted as required in the case of dismissal of a probationary em-
ployee.2 Nonetheless, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal concluded
that since she was given and participated in a hearing, although not
entitled to one, she had waived any procedural defects and the
board's action was in compliance with provisions for dismissal of a
tenured employee, hence must also be in compliance with the proce-
dure for dismissal of a probationary employee.13 A dissenting judge
would have found the procedure illegal since the teacher's right to a
recommendation from her superintendent and her right to know the
nature of the hearing which was to be afforded her should not have
been deemed waived by her appearance and participation in that
hearing."
The scope of review provided in the case of appeals by tenured
37. LA. R.S. 17:442 (1950). Cf. R.S. 17:430 (Supp. 1960) (which makes no provi-
sion for dismissal of trade school teachers and dismissal could be in any manner
authorized by the board). Garner v. State Bd. of Educ., 277 So. 2d 492 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1973).
38. LA. R.S. 17:443 (1950).
39. 275 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
40. Id. at 797.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 800.
44. Id. at 803.
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school teachers is broader than in the case of probationary school
teachers since the statute provides that there shall be a "full hearing
to review the action of the school board, and the court shall have
jurisdiction to affirm or reverse the action of the school board, in the
matter."45 In an earlier school board case our supreme court held that
the general rule with respect to review of agency action is applicable.
Thus the court has said
when there is a rational basis for an administrative board's dis-
cretionary determinations, which are supported by substantial
evidence in so far as factually required, the court has no right to
substitute its judgment for the administrative board or to interv-
ere with the latter's bona fide exercise of its discretion."
In Jennings v. Caddo Parish School Board,47 the district court, re-
viewing the record before the school board, concluded that the deci-
sion was correct and "fully supported by the evidence." The court of
appeal concluded on further review of the record that "the evidence
presented in support of [the charge of incapability of organizing and
carrying on a constructive educational program] is overwhelming"
and affirmed the lower court. While our supreme court has said there
is "no right to substitute . . . judgment for the administrative
board,"1" it seems arguable that the legislature has vested such power
in the court in giving it the power to conduct a full hearing and to
affirm or reverse rather than merely remand. 9 The legislature in
making provisions for review of school board action would seem to
have intended the broadest scope of review applicable to agency ac-
tion5 " short of trial de novo.
Pardue v. Livingston Parish School Board5 ' presents another
facet of a controversy which was before a court of appeal last term.
In that case 2 the court had earlier held that a guidance counselor
45. LA. R.S. 17:443 (1950).
46. Lewing v. DeSoto Par. School Bd., 238 La. 43, 53-54, 113 So. 2d 462, 466
(1959). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1958-1959
Term -Administrative Law, 20 LA. L. REV. 268, 275 (1960).
47. 276 So. 2d 386 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
48. Lewing v. De Soto Par. Sch. Bd., 238 La. 43, 54, 113 So. 2d 462, 466 (1959).
49. LA. R.S. 17:443 (1950).
50. In Lewing, it was held that the review is only on the record insofar as the
school board is concerned but the teacher has the right to introduce additional evi-
dence if she chooses to do so. 238 La. at 52, 113 So. 2d at 465.
51. 276 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
52. Pardue v. Livingston Par. School Bd., 251 So. 2d 833 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972
Term-Administrative Regulation: Law and Procedure, 33 LA. L. REv. 259, 266-67
(1973).
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would be demoted and tenure restrictions would be violated if re-
moved from her counselor position and reassigned as an English
teacher; the court enjoined the board against so acting." Despite the
injunction, the school board failed to retain her in a guidance coun-
selor position and the teacher prayed that the board be ordered to
show cause why it should not be held in contempt. After hearing, the
trial court's response was an order of reinstatement as guidance coun-
selor in a specific school. The court of appeal now holds that there
should have been a trial via ordinaria prior to such a judgment since
the original injunction provided only for retention as a guidance
counselor and did not invade the board's jurisdiction to allocate per-
sonnel within the school's system." Presumably a writ of mandamus
would issue after ordinary proceedings to return the teacher to a
position of guidance counselor somewhere in the school system. How-
ever, such a writ would not lie to order her return to a specific school
in the system, since this would invade the discretion of the board." '
Reeves v. Orleans Parish School Board5" sought to compel school
board meetings to be conducted in public except insofar as the stat-
utes provide for recessing a public meeting for the purpose of con-
ducting a closed or executive recess. The court of appeal held such
statute permissive only and does not preclude a board from holding
closed or executive meetings so long as no final or binding action is
taken at such meetings.
DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
Employees or employers appealing from an adverse decision of
the Division of Employment Security enjoy a broader scope of review
than appellants from the Civil Service Commissions.57 It is, however
a review on the record and the taking of additional evidence at the
trial court level is prohibited; any additional evidence must be taken
53. 251 So. 2d at 835.
54. 276 So. 2d at 904.
55. Accord, White v. Board of Trustees, 276 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
The court of appeal has again noted that a mandamus would not lie to compel a public
official or board to perform a discretionary act. In that case the writ did issue, since
the court held an increase in retirement benefits ordered by the legislature was reme-
dial legislation involving only purely ministerial action on the part of the Board of
Trustees.
56. 264 So. 2d 243 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), writ granted, 262 La. 1165, 266 So.
2d 446 (1972).
57. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972
Term-Administrative Regulation: Law and Procedure, 33 LA. L. REv. 259, 267 (1973).
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before the agency.5" Thus, since Walsworth v. Heard59 was decided it
has been the rule that no judgment on review may be pronounced
prior to the filing of the record by the division; a default judgment
in the absence of the filing of such record is not permitted.6 Nonethe-
less there was a flurry of cases last term in which default judgments
were entered by trial courts because of delay in the filing of such
administrative records; in all, the Walsworth holding was adhered to,
a court of appeal noting that there was nothing before the trial court
from which it could determine whether the findings of the agency
were "supported by sufficient evidence, " the permitted judicial re-
view under the statute.' One court of appeal announced again that
the proper procedure, in the event of delay on the part of the division
in filing the record, was either to proceed by a rule for contempt or
through mandamus proceedings. 2
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARDS
A review of decisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Boards
affords the broadest judicial reconsideration sh6rt of a jury trial.
Appeals are to be filed as ordinary suits tried de novo, with each party
free to amend and supplement pleadings and call additional wit-
nesses. Appeals are devolutive in nature but a prayer for injunctive
relief may accompany appeals. 3 In Felton v. Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Board for City of Baton Rouge, 4 the suit was deemed injunctive
in nature but the appeal court nonetheless held that the suit could
be considered an appeal within the contemplation of the statute al-
though deemed untimely for failure to file within a period of ten days
from notification of the board's decision. 5 Full substitution of judg-
ment prevails also on appeals from district court determinations.
Thus, in Smith v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control,6
the court of appeal determined for itself whether a licensee had taken
reasonable affirmative action to prevent frequenting of a bar by
58. LA. R.S. 23:1634 (1950).
59. 84 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
60. Id. at 256.
61. McBride v. Doyal, 276 So. 2d 394 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Sykes v. Doyal, 265
So. 2d 780 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); Cameron v. National Air., Inc., 264 So. 2d 803 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1972).
62. Cameron v. National Air., Inc., 264 So. 2d 803, 805 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
63. LA. R.S. 33:4788 (1950).
64. 278 So. 2d 136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
65. Id. at 137.
66. 266 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
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minor youths. 7 In State ex rel. Roshto v. Young,"8 the Third Circuit
affirmed revocation of a liquor license but evidenced displeasure with
the harshness of the penalty imposed for a proven violation in allow-
ing minors on the premises. Since no alternative to outright reversal
of the revocation was urged, however, the court affirmed the action
as within the authority of the board and not arbitrary and capricious.
In Schwegmann v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control,"
the court of appeal determined, in agreement with a district court,
that there was intent "in good faith to carry on a bona fide wholesale
liquor business" and applicant was hence entitled to a license." In
Hargett v. Village of South Mansfield,7 a court of appeal agreed with
a district court that the information furnished to the village was in
compliance with applicable statutes and that, absent a village ordi-
nance requiring it, no affidavit of qualifications from applicant's
manager was required for a local permit even though a state permit
did so require.7 2 Presumably, the lack of such a requirement for a local
permit was based on a lesser need for an affidavit because knowledge
of a local manager would be otherwise available.73
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In Joint Legislative Committee v. Strain,74 a majority of our
supreme court interpreted the action of the legislature as vesting the
plaintiff committee with the power to bring criminal contempt pro-
ceedings against members as well as non-members of the legislature
who refuse to testify before the committee. 7 This result was reached
67. State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 275 So. 2d 201 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1973), is illustrative of circumstances in which a narrower scope of review
than full substitution of judgment could have resulted in gross injustice. The Registrar
of Vital Statistics had relied upon records and documents using the terms "mulatto,"
"colored," and "free person of color" and had inferred that such terms meant 1/2 Negro
blood in an ancestor although the terms are undefined in the statute. Combining broad
review with imposition of a burden of proof of "no room for doubt," where a record
change from the Caucasian race to another race is proposed, a court of appeal reversed
a lower court approval of the change on the ground that the burden of proving a
descendant child had 1/32 Negro blood had not been carried; hence no record change
was warranted. On the other hand, there was clearly "some evidence," a limitation on
review which might have carried the day for the Registrar.
68. 265 So. 2d 261 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
69. 266 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
70. Id. at 744-45.
71. 271 So. 2d 378 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
72. Id. at 382-83.
73. Compare LA. R.S. 26:79(B) (1950) with LA. R.S. 26:279(B) (1950).
74. 263 La. 488, 268 So. 2d 629 (1972).
75. Id. at 638-39.
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although the constitutional provision referred to in the legislative
resolution"' deals only with non-members of the legislature. This pro-
vision, which generally empowers the legislature to punish its own
members for disorderly conduct and contempt was not referred to in
the resolution." The fact that the proceeding was initiated by counsel
for the Joint Legislative Committee for a show-cause order and not
by a district attorney under a bill of information, did not deter the
majority; it found the proceeding to be a non-appealable, criminal
contempt, hence subject only to the supervisory jurisdiction of the
supreme court."8 This somewhat strange result was deemed to follow
from the fact that the committee was legislative in function, possess-
ing powers inherent in the legislature, such powers having been dele-
gated to it by legislative resolution." The power to subpoena fellow-
members of the legislature and to subject them to criminal contempt
proceedings in the event of failure to respond would appear to be a
power of such moment that it should not be implied but be specifi-
cally spelled out; this seems particularly so when the criminal pro-
ceeding takes the form of summary punishment by rule invoked by
the committee rather than a district attorney.i0
The extent to which police personnel may be required to answer
questions respecting potential criminal activity was put in issue in
Dieck v. Department of Police." In that case an officer was requested
to take a second polygraph test because an initial test had been
unsatisfactory. The proposed questions were furnished in advance of
examination and were deemed warranted and reasonable. In these
circumstances, failure on the part of the officer to submit to the test
was deemed to warrant dismissal; such dismissal was not an imper-
missible burden on the privilege against self-incrimination even
though the officer considered himself a criminal suspect, in view of
the fact that the questions related specifically to the performance of
official duties."
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Ehmig,"3 that association
recommended to our supreme court that a member of the association
be suspended from the practice of law on the ground that he had been
76. LA. CONST. art. III, § 10.
77. 268 So. 2d at 632.
78. Id. at 635.
79. Id. at 636.
80. Id. at 641 (dissentingopinion).
81. 266 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
82. Id. at 503, See also Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)(cited
in concurring opinion).
83. 277 So. 2d 137 (La. 1973).
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convicted of a serious crime. The member had been convicted of a
violation of the Federal Internal Revenue Code for filing a fraudulent
"return, statement, or other document."84 Association Articles of In-
corporation defined a serious crime as "a felony or any other crime,
the necessary element of which as determined by the statute defining
such crime, reflects upon the attorney's moral fitness to practice
law." 5 No hearing was held prior to the recommendation of suspen-
sion and the member moved that the order of suspension be revoked
on the ground that the due process provisions of the federal and state
constitutions had been violated. 6 The motion was granted on the
ground that due process of law required a hearing addressed to the
issue of whether or not a "serious crime" had been committed. 7 A
dissenting justice suggested that such a hearing would avail the
claimant nothing since the certificate of conviction coupled with the
language of the statute under which the conviction was had (which
defined the crime as a felony) was all that was needed; all issues of
fact and law to which a hearing might be addressed were thus already
resolved."8
In North Carolina v. Pierce,9 the United States Supreme Court
held that in the absence of an impelling reason reflected by the re-
cord, a tribunal could not impose a more severe sentence after a new
trial, since to do so would violate due process of law guarantees of the
United States Constitution. Specifically that court noted that "vind-
ictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his
first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a
new trial . . .due process . . . requires that a defendant be freed of
apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sent-
encing judge."98 In In Re Coppola,9 a commission on government
ethics suspended a state police officer for a period of thirty days for
violation of an ethics code. After judicial review the matter was re-
manded to the commission to remedy procedural defects in the initial
proceedings. On further proceedings the commission made an addi-
tional charge and found all charges established; it then changed its
sanction from suspension for thirty days to demotion in rank for a
84. Id. at 138.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 139.
87. Id. at 140.
88. Id. at 140-41. Cf. Thomas v. Ruffin, 270 So. 2d 224 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972)
(agency hearing involving disputed inferences of fact).
89. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
90. Id. at 725.
91. 270 So. 2d 190 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), writ granted, 272 So. 2d 373 (La. 1973).
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period of a year (later amended to demotion for a period of six
months). The court of appeal held that the punishment imposed on
rehearing was in excess of that initially imposed and hence violated
the principles set out in the Pierce case since the record was devoid
of any "impelling reason" for the imposition of a greater penalty."2
The court noted that "such a procedure chills the exercise of basic
constitutional rights . . . by putting a high price on appeal in viola-
tion of due process of law. '"
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
In Central Louisiana Telephone Company v. Louisiana Public
Service Commission," our supreme court examined the constitu-
tional history of article VI, § 35 providing injunctive relief only
against rate orders of the commission and concluded that it was not
the intent of the constitutional draftsmen to exclude non-rate orders
from such relief on the principle of inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius. ' The section was drafted to supplant a provision suspending
penalties for violation of rate orders during court "contestation" and,
a majority held, should not be the basis for an implication that only
rate orders could thereafter be enjoined since no other constitutional
provision specifically precluded the injunction of non-rate orders.96 A
dissenting justice argued that there was a rational basis for providing
an injunction against a rate order causing revenue deficiencies which
could not later be remedied whereas a non-rate order would have no
such direct effect on revenues."7
92. Id. at 193.
93. Id. It is to be noted, however, that a right of review as such is not in every
instance assured by virtue of the due process clause. The United States Supreme Court
has said only that where it is afforded it may not be impermissibly burdened in its
exercise so that it is discriminatorily afforded. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1955).
Thus in Smith v. Dunn, 263 La. 599, 268 So. 2d 670 (1972), our supreme court affirmed
the dismissal of mandamus proceedings brought for the purpose of requiring a parole
board to state the reasons for its denial of parole. It was noted that the legislature could
properly provide that there be no appeal from a board's decision on the granting or
refusing of parole and that the administrative procedure act could not be construed to
provide such an appeal as a matter of administrative procedure. Id. at 671. The court
concluded that the Board of Parole is not the sort of agency or board contemplated as
subject to such general law. The court also rejected amicus curiae argument that it
would be a denial of due process to refuse even the privilege of parole without a
disclosure of reasons since this constitutional issue, if such it was, had not been pro-
perly raised. Id. at 672.
94. 262 La. 819, 264 So. 2d 905 (1972).
95. Id. at 826, 264 So. 2d at 907.
96. Id. at 828, 264 So. 2d at 908.
97. Id. at 848, 264 So. 2d at 915.
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Truck Service, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission"
presented our supreme court with another opportunity to strengthen
its position of limited judicial review for decisions of the commission.
In a case involving an additional certification of a motor carrier over
a route where there was an existing certification, a trial court had
held that there was no evidence that the public convenience and
necessity would be "materially promoted" by such new certificate.99
A witness for the shipper had testified that the new applicant could
perform the projected intrastate hauling since it had extensive inter-
state experience in hauling the commodity. The certificated carrier,
on the other hand, had performed no hauling of the commodity what-
soever, although it had subcontracted some hauling of the commodity
under its certification. In these circumstances, the trial court was in
error in holding that there was no evidence that the public conveni-
ence and necessity would be materially promoted; there was only no
evidence that the existing certificate holder was not capable of haul-
ing the commodity. 00 The court quoted approvingly from a prior
decision that "if the applicant adduces evidence before the Commis-
sion which clearly shows that the public convenience and necessity
would be materially promoted by the issuance of the certificate, it is
immaterial whether the evidence making this clear showing is termed
adequate or is termed 'substantial.' ''101 Thus, it was sufficient that
there was some evidence introduced from which the commission
could reasonably draw its conclusion. The reviewing court was
charged with upholding the order whether or not on like evidence the
court would have made a similar ruling."21
Another articulation of the rule of limited judicial review to deci-
sions of the commission was presented in Hendrix v. Louisiana Pub-
lic Service Commission. 103 Under existing statutes where a Pilot Fee
Commission is unable to agree upon a revision of existing rates the
commissioners may certify the issue to the Public Service Commis-
sion and the decision of that commission will constitute the decision
of the pilotage commission. 104 The court found evidence in the record
to sustain an increase in the fees charged by bar pilots and to sustain
a higher fee schedule for bar pilots than for other river pilots. The
98. 263 La. 588, 268 So. 2d 666 (1972).
99. Id. at 594, 268 So. 2d at 668.
100. Id. at 595, 268 So. 2d at 668.
101. Id. at 594, 268 So. 2d at 668.
102. Id. at 598, 268 So. 2d at 669, citing Rubion Trans. and Stor. Co. v. Louisiana
Pub. Serv. Comm., 240 La. 440, 123 So. 2d 880 (1960).
103. 262 La. 420, 263 So. 2d 343 (1972).
104. LA. R.S. 34:1121-27 (Supp. 1968).
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court noted that a reviewing court is to ascertain only whether, in
fixing rates and charges, the Public Service Commission was arbi-
trary and capricious and rendered its order unsupported by evidence;
in the absence of such circumstances, the trial judge committed error
in substituting his judgment for the commission's.I'5
In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Louisiana Public Serv-
ice Commission,"" our supreme court reviewed a record containing
evidence of a holding either way but with the railroad urging that the
holding for the commission constituted an abuse of discretion. Specif-
ically, the Commission approved a right of way request over railroad
tracks which the railroad contended was less suitable and convenient
to it and the public than the right of way it proposed. The site ap-
proved was one readily coordinated with donated rights of way from
nearby landholders whereas funds for a crossing elsewhere were una-
vailable. In these circumstances, the decision of the commission
could not be deemed an abuse of discretion as may have been the case
in Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission,"7 where the site approved by the commission was po-
tentially hazardous to the public and not merely less suitable and
convenient than another site urged by the railroad.
In 1971 South Central Bell Telephone Company was granted an
increase in tariffs to yield 7.925 per cent on average intrastate net
investment but within the year petitioned the commission for an
increase to 9.5 per cent. As an interim measure it petitioned for an
immediate increase in tariffs on the ground they had failed to yield
the granted 7.925 per cent. It urged that tariff increases to accomplish
this result could be granted without hearing since they would do no
more than assure an approved rate of return. The commission re-
ferred the supplementary petition to the hearings on the primary
petition and the utility appealed. In South Central Bell Telephone
Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,"° our supreme court
agreed with a district court that the utility is not entitled to any such
automatic rate increases and that the earned returns of 7.4% for 1971
and 6.33% of 1972 do not constitute confiscation. 09 The court con-
ceded that the utility should, perhaps, receive a higher rate of return
on its investment and would then be entitled to have the commission
fix tariffs which would produce such a return. However, the commis-
105. 262 La. at 441-42, 263 So. 2d at 350-51.
106. 262 La. 391, 263 So. 2d 333 (1972).
107. 254 La. 160, 223 So. 2d 132 (1969).
108. 272 So. 2d 667 (La. 1973).
109. Id. at 669.
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sion was entitled to examine new test period data preliminary to
granting any increase; the noted rates of return which would be in
effect during the interim period were not deemed tantamount to con-
fiscation."" Dissenting justices urged the granting of the petition on
the ground that confiscation may take place despite the fact that the
company is not yet operating at a loss, citing in support thereof the
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co."' and In Re
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases"' where it was said the test of confis-
cation was whether the commission saw to it "that the amount after
expenses remaining for the investor can reasonably be expected to
maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly
compensate investors for the risk they have assumed and yet provide
appropriate protection to the relevant public interest both existing
and foreseeable.""' The dissent failed to note, however, that the cited
cases, together with the Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co."' case, represented an abandonment of older confisca-
tion notions which had developed incident to the use of the eminent
domain analogy in utility rate fixing and an espousal of the reasona-
bleness or due process test cited above."5 Under the due process test
it is apparent that the regulating body may achieve reasonableness
over a relatively extended period; on the other hand, under the emi-
nent domain analogy pursuant to which the confiscation language
was used, failure to earn a fair return on the fair value of the proper-
ties was deemed to be confiscatory for whatever period in which it
occurred. "'
110. Id.
111. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
112. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
113. Id. at 792.
114. 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
115. See Dakin, The Changing Nature of Utility Rate Regulation, 36 TutL. L. REV.
401, 434-35 (1962).
116. Id.
